In a significant policy shift, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the United States has recently enacted new restrictions on submarine cable projects, citing an escalation of threats posed by foreign adversaries, particularly China. This move has sparked criticism among analysts who perceive these actions as an unnecessary overreach of national security measures that could jeopardize the efficiency of the telecommunications sector.

The FCC's newly adopted regulations aim to bolster the development of secure submarine cable infrastructure, ensuring that the US can efficiently meet current and future internet demands. According to the Commission, these measures are essential to uphold the US's status as a global leader in technology, particularly in emerging fields like artificial intelligence.

Moreover, the FCC indicated that the new rules are designed to streamline foreign investment into the US while simultaneously curbing the influence of countries deemed as threats. This regulatory framework heavily underscores the stance that nations, especially China, are increasingly viewed as significant risks to American national security, thus warranting stringent oversight.

Veteran telecom analyst Ma Jihua contends that these latest restrictions represent an intensification of US policies aimed at containing China's technological advances and suppressing its high-tech industries. This perception reflects deep-seated concerns within the US regarding China's swift growth in critical technology sectors.

Ma further argues that the underlying objective of these regulations is to diminish China's industrial competitiveness while attempting to monopolize strategic sectors like the internet and AI. He posits that by controlling global submarine cable networks, the US is striving to dominate vital digital infrastructures.

As Chinese firms emerge as influential players in the submarine cable industry, they have increasingly experienced regulatory pushback from the US government. The FCC, which traditionally oversees telecommunications operators, has focused on Chinese entities since 2021, framing its actions within the context of national security threats.

Dismissive of US allegations, Ma described them as unfounded, emphasizing that submarine cables, made of optical fiber, are inert systems lacking complex electronics that could host espionage capabilities. He points out that these cables are primarily focused on transmission.

Highlighting the collaborative nature of submarine cable construction, Ma explained that these systems are typically integrated through multinational efforts, with China merely being one part of a larger network. He attributes the US's anxiety to an inherent fear of competition from China's evolving technological prowess.

The FCC's Report and Order introduces various initiatives meant to safeguard submarine cable systems from foreign influence. Key elements include granting presumptions of denial for licenses connected to suspected adversarial entities, a move seen as a tightening of international restrictions.

However, analysts like Ma question the viability of these restrictive actions, arguing they counteract the intended goals. He asserts that attempting to monopolize submarine cables would ultimately hinder the efficiency of global communication networks, adversely affecting not only international players but also the US telecom industry.

In response to these persistent accusations, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning has vehemently denied US claims, characterizing them as baseless attempts to malign Chinese organizations. She criticized the US for broadening the scope of national security to undermine global competitors and safeguard its hegemony in technology.